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FROM CUBA LIBRE TO HIND SWARAJ 
STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 
Abstract 
What explains the violent or nonviolent nature of a social movement? While much literature exists on both 
phenomena separately, this essay compares the charismatic leaderships of two liberation movements, one 
violent and one nonviolent, to attempt to identify the determinants for the respective violent or nonviolent 
strategy. The two case studies, Mahatma Gandhi in India and Che Guevara in Cuba, show similar starting 
points, characterized by a deep compassion for disenfranchised and marginalized people in their regions 
suffering from an exploitative foreign power. This paper identifies three main factors that influenced Mahatma 
Gandhi and Che Guevara to join or lead a nonviolent and a violent movement, respectively: 1) the historical 
and structural context of the countries and regions, 2) the influence of travel on the development of ideology,  
3) Che Guevara’s witnessing of the overthrow of Árbenz’ government in Guatemala, and Gandhi’s time in 
South Africa as significant turning points. As a result, both movements will be studied in comparison and the 
conclusion drawn that both Gandhi and Che Guevara a) had unique, larger visions for their people and 
struggles; b) had well-defined, short-term goals of self-determination; c) shaped their revolutionary strategies 
with unique ideological aspects, which then led them to opt for violent or nonviolent tactics. 
Introduction 
 Historically, physical strength has led to power. Charles Darwin’s theory of ‘survival 
of the fittest’ confirmed that those that can assert themselves physically and biologically are 
more likely to survive than the physically weak. Violence, thus, is equated to power. Abuse 
of the power exemplified in physical strength by a leader, however, can lead to horrifying 
realities. Power, therefore, has historically been understood in these terms, disregarding the 
importance of mental strength, discipline and persistence.  
 Violent resistance movements striving for self-determination mostly mirror the 
abusive superior power or government in trying to defeat it through the same means. 
Nonviolent resistance movements, however, rely on the power and strength of the mind, 
having morals on their side. Historically, both types of resistance movements have led to 
success and bitter failures, but emphasis on the outcomes, rather than the factors and events 
that led to the outcomes overshadow the possible answer to the bigger questions of why one 
movement went this or the other way.  
 So what influences a movement or a leader to start a violent or a nonviolent 
movement? What are the structural conditions that provide for one or the other, and what role 
does the leaders’ agency play in this decision (if it really is a decision free to make). Due to a 
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gap in literature comparing the factors that explore the forces behind the strategic or 
ideological choices of using nonviolence or violence in a resistance movement, this paper 
will explore these forces by studying two resistance movements in comparison: Gandhi’s 
civil disobedience in India, and Che Guevara’s guerrilla revolution in Cuba. The paper will 
investigate both structure and agency allowing for the rise of the two leaders, followed by a 
comparison of the intricacies and striking similarities of the two movements and their leaders, 
to contribute to scholarship trying to explain the employment of violence or nonviolence 
when faced with an exploitative and superior foreign power.  
Concepts “Cuba Libre” and “Hind Swaraj” 
To begin, clarification on the terminology in the title may be necessary. “Cuba Libre” 
is Spanish for “Free Cuba” and insinuates the nature and motivation of Che Guevara’s 
struggle in Cuba, as well as the broader vision of freeing Cuba and Latin America from US 
imperialism and Cold War interventionism. “Hind Swaraj” stands for “Indian Home Rule,” a 
concept coined by Gandhi, who also wrote an eponymous book, in which he laid out his idea 
of freedom. Gandhi understood swaraj, which literally means self-rule, both in the political, 
as well as the spiritual sense, though he was of the opinion that individual self-rule needs to 
precede Indian political self-rule (Heredia, 1999). 
Other foreign words and concepts that will be frequently used and referred to are ahimsa 
(nonviolence), satyagraha (lit.: holding firm to truth), and revolución (revolution) (Dalton, 
1993).  
Literature Review 
 Conflict, violence, forms of insurgents and revolts, and, to a lesser extent, 
nonviolence, have been studied extensively and countless theories exist as to what factors 
contribute to the outbreak or emergence of one or the other. However, when trying to 
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determine why some social movements develop into violent conflicts and some into mass 
nonviolent campaigns, it appears that these two very connected phenomena have been studied 
separately; there is a lack of literature on the strategic approach of a movement. Not all 
violent resistance movements consist of armed fighting and conventional or unconventional 
warfare, and not all nonviolent movements stay entirely nonviolent, where sporadic outbreaks 
of violence are likely. However, as will be discussed later, a clearly defined vision is essential 
for the longevity and/or success of a movement, and choosing violence or nonviolence as a 
tactic is an important and central part of that vision. 
Gandhi is celebrated as the founding father of nonviolent resistance, an interesting 
detail, as that indicates that nonviolent resistance did not exist before the early 20th century. 
Indeed, Seferiades and Johnston (2012) confirm that “until the mid-twentieth century, those 
scholars who paid attention to collective action took for granted that mass protests were 
associated with violence or the threat of violence” (Seferiades and Johnston, 2012). Violence 
seems to be a more exciting research focus; crime and brutality are active, horrendous and 
cause outraged fascination. Talk about wars, or terrorist attacks has become so normal that 
we are desensitized to it and think that it is necessary for political change to occur. Thus, in 
Erica Chenoweth’s words, in an activist’s perspective, violence, though tragic, is logical for 
people to use to seek their change (Chenoweth, TedxBoulder, minute 1.28). 
 Nonviolence, on the other hand, is considered weak, is oftentimes confused with 
passivity and, “well-intentioned, but dangerously naïve” (Chenoweth, TedxBoulder, minute 
1:42). According to Chenoweth’s and Stephen’s extensive, quantitative study on nonviolent 
resistance movements, however, nonviolent movements from 1900-2006 were twice as likely 
to succeed, and are almost four times as likely to usher in democracy (Chenoweth, 
TedxBoulder). So why do some movements choose violence over nonviolence, and vice 
versa?  
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 Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham is amongst the few scholars who have attempted to 
answer this question. Her research focuses on movements seeking self-determination in 
oppressive regimes, and answers the question “Why do groups with similar grievances 
challenge the state in different ways?” (Cunningham, 2013). She identifies three ways 
towards self-determination: 1) conventional political channels, 2) violent struggle, 3) 
nonviolent campaigns. Presenting her argument, Cunningham identifies multiple factors that 
help us understand the strategic choice, which either leads to the occurrence of a large-scale 
civil war or mass nonviolence. Cunningham’s research only covers a small area of a largely 
understudied field of research, which she recognizes, and points to directions for future 
research.  
 As already mentioned, little attention has been paid to the strategic choice of 
nonviolence or violence; instead, both have been studied independently. Considering social 
movements and nonviolence, Gene Sharp has received considerable recognition and public 
attention; he boasts a number of books on nonviolent resistance, amongst which “From 
Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation,” a handbook to starting 
a revolution. The following will attempt to find overlap between studies on violence and 
nonviolence.  
 According to Sharp, the main reason why individuals, groups, or movements perceive 
violence to be the only plausible way to fighting an oppressive regime is as a reaction of 
political violence exercised on the population by oppressive regimes. As a regime inflicts 
violence on its citizens and destroys any possibility for its population to bring the regime to 
justice through civic institutions, violence, to many, seems to be the only option (Sharp, 
2010). This argument would explain numerous violent revolutions, and/or struggles for 
independence or self-determination, in which the rebels consider the costs of a violent 
struggle low enough, or do not see an alternative way to reach their goals. However, as Sharp 
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notes, “violent rebellion can trigger brutal repressions that frequently leaves the populace 
more helpless than before” (Sharp, 2010: 4). Violent revolutionary movements or secessionist 
groups are likely to cause the outbreak of civil wars, especially under an oppressive regime 
that is unashamed in its use of violence on its own population. Popovic, a prominent 
nonviolent resistance fighter in the Serbian struggle makes the point clear by stating: “If 
you’re going to compete with David Beckham, why choose the soccer field? Better to choose 
the chessboard” (Rosenberg, 2015). 
 In contrast, nonviolent resistance meets the regime on a different battlefield where the 
regime does not have a military advantage and does not enjoy the moral high ground 
(Chenoweth, 2011). Sharp dedicates his fourth chapter in “From Dictatorship to Democracy” 
on dictatorship’s weaknesses, and how one should counter them. He writes, “disciplined 
courageous nonviolent resistance in face of the dictators’ brutalities may induce unease, 
disaffection, unreliability, and in extreme situations even mutiny among the dictators’ own 
soldiers and population” (Sharp, 2010: 35). A movement’s decision to withstand a regime’s 
violence by engaging in civil disobedience, therefore, causes a regime to lose its authoritative 
status. The regime, if unwilling to give in to the movement’s demands, is forced to show its 
ugly face, meet the movement with brutality and thus stir national and international attention 
and contempt concerning Human Right violations. The movement’s task, then, is it to 
identify the regime’s weakness(es) and act upon them accordingly. Every dictatorship has an 
“Achilles’” heel, exploiting those weaknesses, thus, “tend to make the regime less effective 
and more vulnerable to changing conditions and deliberate resistance” (Sharp, 2010: 28). 
 Sharp notes that nonviolence requires courage and patience (Sharp, 2010). While the 
notion of power will be discussed later in this paper, it should be said that weapons provide 
the holder with a power that, superficially, cannot be compared to the empty hands of a 
nonviolent activist. Too often, nonviolence is equated with pacifism and passiveness 
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(Chenoweth, 2011). However, the absence of weapons does not equate to passiveness or 
pacifism; nonviolence is active and the participation entails quite a lot of risks. As Erica 
Chenoweth puts it, “potential recruits to the resistance need to overcome fear, but not their 
moral qualms about using violence against others” (Chenoweth, 201). It is this fear that 
Gandhi addressed in the foundations of his movement. Dalton writes, “It was the willingness 
of Indians to cooperate with the British Raj out of fear what troubled Gandhi” (Dalton, 1993: 
7), which is why central to Gandhi’s fundamental teachings was the teaching of fearlessness 
and truth in action (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2006).  
Despite the respect Gene Sharp enjoys for his work on nonviolence, scholars have 
voiced critique, amongst them Sean Chabot. Chabot is mainly concerned with the lack of 
“finer-grained explorations of social movement phronesis to gain better sense of how activists 
become proficient and virtuoso performers” (Chabot, 2015: 252). According to Chabot, the 
line between violence and nonviolence is not as clear as Sharp argues (Chabot, 2015). While 
Sharp tries to establish a grand and universal theory, Chabot considers it too general, and too 
abstract in order to be useful in practical terms: “by appealing to ‘the head,’ Sharp dismisses 
‘the heart’ of nonviolent action and activists” (Chabot, 2015: 250). Thus, Chabot advocates 
for a more nuanced analysis of nonviolence, which includes a more practical approach and 
accounts for cultural differences. While he recognizes Gene Sharp’s influential work as 
useful for the earlier stages of nonviolent resistance, he criticizes the emphasis on theory, 
rules, and universal solutions. According to Chabot, Sharp’s work lacks in providing a 
practical rulebook to action. Emphasizing phronesis, rather than episteme and techne, Chabot 
highlights the importance of resisters’ development of skills, practical wisdom and learning-
by-doing: While it is essential to have an “abstract understanding and technical skills, (…) 
only practical wisdom can ensure that available means are used for beneficial ends” (Chabot, 
2015).   
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Charismatic leadership is oftentimes considered “mysterious” (Conger, 1989: 21) and 
interpreted in many different ways, fitting the respective context charismatic leaders emerge 
in. It is not clearly defined whether charisma can only be attributed to persons of a certain 
position, or whether charismatic individuals can exist throughout society. Discourse on 
charisma and charismatic leadership mostly celebrates Max Weber’s discussion as 
groundbreaking, and his theory of sources of authority essential. Since then, scholars have 
criticized, expanded on and changed his definition in search for a more complete and 
universal one.  
Charisma, according to Weber, is the “certain quality of an individual personality by 
virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities” (Weber, 1968: 48). 
Charisma being one of Weber’s three sources of authority/power, can thus “revolutionize 
political authority (…) by the sheer force of his or her personality” (Conger, 1989: 22).  
 While personality and the individual are important factors in a charismatic leader, 
Weber also notes that only through the recognition on the part of those subject to authority 
can a charismatic leadership be validated (Weber, 1968: 49). In other words, a charismatic 
leader is not a leader until he has a respected following. Similarly, Douglas F. Barnes (1978) 
writes, “charisma is not an individualistic phenomena hinging only on the extraordinary 
quality of a leader’s personality” (Barnes, 1978: 15), implying that emergence of a 
charismatic leadership is dependent on a complex web of factors, which, in synergy, provide 
for a charismatic leadership. The leader and his followers, therefore are engaging in a 
mutually benefiting relationship, where the leader relies on his following to be recognized as 
a leader, and the following relying on the leader for showing the way.  
 It is impossible to find a universal set of factors that lead to the emergence of a 
charismatic leader, as the differ greatly depending on the specific historical, geographical, 
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political, social, economic circumstances. Barnes identifies four basic propositions, which 
describe variables or conditions necessary for the emergence of a charismatic leader. Since 
his article, “Charisma and Religious Leadership: An Historical Analysis,” includes religion in 
his discussion on charismatic leadership, three out of the four propositions focus on religion. 
His second principle, however, is helpful in the present analysis.  
 Barnes’ second principle reads: “they [charismatic leaders] will live during a period 
of social change or be members of a minority group” (Barnes, 1978: 3). Thus, social change 
or the identity of a minority group, are important factors when considering the emergence of 
charismatic leaders. According to Barnes, charismatic leaders arise in times of chaos and 
promise to resolve the issue by providing innovative solutions, which find resonance amongst 
the populace that is disillusioned with those in power. Interesting to note is that, according to 
Barnes, a breakdown in traditional authority is necessary for a charismatic leader to emerge 
in the chaos that is consequently created. In contrast, Weber, who considers charisma one of 
three sources of authority, does not include the necessary break down of the traditional 
authority in his discussion. Thus, the question is whether charismatic leaders could cause the 
chaos which then provides for their popular rise to power.  
 In his discussion on subjective conditions (=leadership) and objective conditions 
(=structural context) that allow for the emergence of revolutions, Che Guevara seems to 
answer exactly that question. He writes that “(…) leadership, can accelerate or delay 
revolution, depending on the state of their development” (Guevara, 1969: 91). Therefore, the 
argument can be made that it is either the objective conditions that lead to the rise of a 
(charismatic) leader, or the presence of a (charismatic) leader, who can make the context 
happen, in which he or she rises to power and leadership.  
 Despite Jay Conger’s application of charismatic leadership in the context of 
(corporate) organizations, his very practical outline of the term is beneficial to this analysis of 
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charismatic leadership in a political context. In his view, charismatic leaders carry within 
themselves a restless dissatisfaction with the status quo, which then leads to a constant 
intention to challenge the status quo (Conger, 1989). This view expands Barnes’ argument, 
who considers a radical (social) change in the status quo necessary for the emergence of a 
charismatic leader. While Barnes does not specify whether charismatic leaders can also cause 
that social upheaval in which they consequently arise, Conger does allow for this more ample 
approach, where he considers charismatic leaders to be seeking for opportunities to 
challenge, and possibly overthrow, the status quo. Interestingly enough, Seferiades and 
Johnston state that a change in status quo is also necessary for violence to occur in a 
movement. Possibility for an interesting parallel is thus provided between charismatic leaders 
and violent movements (Seferiades and Johnston, 2012).  
In addition to Barnes’ necessary condition of social change, James M. Mohr, drawing 
on Nadler and Tushman, identifies three much more personal components of charismatic 
leadership: envisioning, energizing, and enabling (Mohr, 2013). According to Mohr, the 
presence of social change is not sufficient for a charismatic leadership to arise. In accordance 
with this argument, a well-articulated vision will allow for a more consolidated movement 
and following. Similarly, Conger states that a strategic vision “provides a certain clarity at a 
time when things may not be very clear” (Conger, 1989: 5). Especially during times of social 
unrest, the population longs for stability, yet not for a return to the previous status quo. A 
charismatic leader, who provides an innovative solution as part of a broader vision, can 
conceptualize and promote a better future. In that sense, charismatic leaders are seen as 
opportunists stepping in when the population longs for a savior (Conger, 1989). 
Two Icons in Comparison 
Considering the aforementioned discussion on charismatic leadership, both Gandhi 
and Che Guevara can easily be considered charismatic leaders. A superficial overview of the 
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two individuals and their iconic nature, followed by a note on their very similar ideological 
starting points, serve as justification for their study in comparison as case studies. 
Both Gandhi and Che Guevara were educated professionals – Gandhi a London-
educated lawyer, and Che Guevara a doctor of medicine. Due to their professions, and Che 
Guevara’s European ancestry, they enjoyed a superior social status in their regions. Despite 
their comfortable economic and social situations, however, they both decided to leave, give 
up any kind of comfort and luxury and lead two struggles with the goal of self-determination 
from a superior, foreign power. Upon the (more or less) successful revolutionary movements, 
neither Gandhi nor Che Guevara emerged as the leading political figures, being second to 
Nehru and Fidel Castro, respectively. Fast-forward to their deaths, both leaders were 
assassinated but live on in people’s memories until today, whether remembered for their 
ideologies and dedication to social reform, or simply for their iconic pictures, adorning 
bumper stickers, t-shirt, and even tattoos.  
Similar ideological starting points for Gandhi’s and Che Guevara’s struggles 
 Upon closer examination of Gandhi’s and Che Guevara’s starting points in their quest 
for a mission and purpose in life, a similar sense of compassion for the disenfranchised and 
marginalized people in their regions, who were suffering from the exploitation of a superior, 
foreign power can be identified. This similarity in ideological starting point in the context of 
the studies of nonviolent and violent movements leads to the following Research Question. 
Research Question 
Considering that Gandhi and Che Guevara had similar ideological starting points and 
motivations influencing and informing their subsequent struggles, why did Gandhi lead a 
nonviolent movement, and Che Guevara a violent one?  
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Historical and structural context of violence and nonviolence 
 India: Colonialism in Juxtaposition with India’s Traditions and Past 
India was subjected to the rule of the British Raj, when, during the years leading up to the 
turn of the century, the world underwent serious militarization. According to Misra, “intense 
competition between European states and Japan to build and expand their empires gave 
aristocratic military elites in Europe and Asia enhanced power and prestige” (Misra, 2014: 
691). The industrial revolutions that rippled through Europe also increased the physical 
ability of weapon manufacturing, which in turn increased their dependency on and the 
importance of their colonies to provide raw materials. An increase in both weapon 
manufacturing and strong European nationalist sentiments led to a destabilization of the 
world and a global glorification of military might. The West characterized its physical 
superiority through modernization and military might. Pro-militaristic sentiments were 
common also in India, where Britain, following the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857, turned to favoring 
the land-controlling warrior groups (Misra, 2014). Indians proudly supported the successful 
employment of the Indian National Army in various conflicts; for many, the Indian National 
Army, in its glorification of Western ideals, represented India’s path forward.  
 Indian appreciation for violence, thus, was an attempt to imitate the West in its 
physical might. While the East looked longingly towards the West, Western depiction of 
Indians and their culture was studded with derogatory language and a sense of superiority. 
The West, thus, viewed the Indians as an inferior people, overemphasizing and 
oversexualizing the “exotic,” rather than appreciating India in its comprehensiveness. This 
orientalist rhetoric to describe Indians intensified Indian sense of inferiority, a rhetoric they 
adopted and in turn strived to be as Western as possible. The obsession and glorification of 
military might, thus, did not spare India in its quest for Western imitation (Sen, 2005; 
Doniger 2009). 
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Quite similarly, Wendy Doniger identifies some of the characteristics, or stereotypes, the 
East and West are ascribed with – East: Religion, spirit, nature, the exotic, adventure, danger 
Romanticism (including Orientalism), myth, feminine; West: Science, materialism, the city, 
boredom, comfort, safety, the enlightenment, logos, male. Besides the aggrandizement of 
stereotypes, the problem with Orientalism and Occidentalism is the internalization of those 
stereotypes. Thus, Indians accepted the unidimensional and oversimplified readings of India 
and Indians as true, internalized the feeling of inferiority, strived for a more Western lifestyle 
and, out of shame tried to cover up the aspects of Indian culture and religion they deemed 
filthy and barbarian – a concept Doniger refers to as “a kind of colonial and religious down-
syndrome” (Doniger, 2009: 384 - 385).  
 This typical colonial exploitative relationship, however, is in contrast with India’s 
context prior to colonialism. The Indian Subcontinent, due to its wealth in resources, had 
been invaded and conquered numerous times, resulting in the rich diversity in cultures, 
ethnicities, languages, and religions. However, the difference of the British to the Mughals, 
for example, was that the Mughals came to stay. Although violence may have been used to 
establish themselves, once in power, India’s conquerors allowed for much independence 
amongst its population, which coexisted relatively peacefully.  
It can be argued, therefore, that the Indian cultures had a past of nonviolent traditions, 
a tradition the British Raj supported and nurtured. As Rudolph and Rudolph point out, “even 
while British rule was making clear that Indians lacked power, it strengthened the non-violent 
dimensions of Indian culture by providing educational and related service opportunities that 
required the skills and temperament of the office rather than the scepter and sword (Rudolph 
& Rudolph, 2006). Willingly or not, by emphasizing its own military superiority, and “male” 
traits, and attributing Indians with feminine traits, Britain strengthened Indians’ institutional 
competencies, necessary for the establishment of democracy. Amartya Sen’s famous “The 
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Argumentative Indian” further supports the traditional Indian ideas of conflict management in 
a purely non-violent, argumentative manner. In his argument he outlines that Indians enjoyed 
an old tradition of public discussion and conflict resolution focusing on deemphasis of overt 
clashes, compromise, consensus, evidence and morality (Sen, 2005; Rudolph & Rudolph 
2006). Mogul ruler Ashoka seems to have united these two virtues in his rule over the vast 
Indian Subcontinent, by raising nonviolence as well as argumentative nature to the state level 
(Sen, 2005).   
Many of India’s traditions and virtues are rooted in the teachings of its ancient 
religions that were either born in the Indian Subcontinent, or brought from the Middle East or 
Europe. Obviously, I cannot go into all of them, and neither do I have the knowledge to do 
so. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism all religions value nonviolence high in their virtue and 
if not a way to become closer to God, see nonviolence as a path to salvation and an inner 
transcendence of human being (Kozhuvanal, 2013; Chekki, 1993).  
 Therefore, the argument can be made that overt militarism to such a grand scale was a 
consequence of the British colonial legacy. Numerous scholars, however, point towards the 
“unique character“ of India’s culture and its “pervasive influence throughout history” (Roy, 
1976: 4). It is in this “unique character” that one can find traditional roots of non-violence. 
The combination of Gandhi’s application and adoption and of numerous Indian traditions, 
“the result was a principle that evoked rich religious symbolism contributed to a dynamic 
method of action unique in Indian history” (Dalton, 1993: 14). 
However, it would be erroneous to look only at these structural circumstances to 
explain why Gandhi’s movement of civil disobedience was successful, especially taking into 
account the militant sentiments and Indian cowardice and inferiority mentioned earlier. It is 
thus important to look at Gandhi’s agency to see how his ideology evolved from one that 
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supported the British unconditionally, to one that rallied mass support for Indian nationalism 
against British colonialism.  
 
Latin America: A Violent History 
In contrast, Che Guevara was a product of complex Latin American exogenous and 
endogenous factors and dynamics that were partly rooted in its past, as well as exacerbated 
during the 20th century. Spanning from the violent Spanish conquest, over the violent 
independence movements, to the replacement of Spanish foreign control by US imperialism, 
violence has dominated Latin American assertion to politics and the transfer to power (Pinto 
Soria 1999). Economic interest has historically characterized foreign interventionism in Latin 
America, however, the independence wars and revolutions did not bring about the desired 
liberation from foreign elitist rule. Instead, a new economic elite, the mestizos, led the wars of 
independence, out of which they emerged as the political elite, and thereby prevented major 
social changes that would have undermined their status (Gabbert, 2012). In an effort to 
establish a more homogenized society and acting upon new, liberal economic ideals of 
commercial agriculture, indigenous communities suffered from systematic violence 
employed against them (Gabbert, 2012). While stating that Latin America has historically 
always been violent is a sweeping generalization, political violence did establish itself and 
was made use of more often than not. Che Guevara would stated in his Guerrilla Warfare: A 
Method, “At the outset of the past century, the peoples of America freed themselves from 
Spanish colonialism, but they did not free themselves from exploitation. (…) Latin America 
today is under a more ferocious imperialism, more powerful and ruthless, than the Spanish 
colonial empire” (Guevara, 1969).  
Similarly, William S. Stokes writes, “The history of Latin America from 
independence to the present time is a history of violent struggles” (Stokes, 1952: 461). He 
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outlines the numerous approaches1 to organize, maintain and change governments by using 
force that had established themselves in Latin America (Stokes, 1952). Interesting to note is 
that Stokes’ views represent an important time in Latin America’s history. His article was 
published in 1952, the year Batista took power through a coup d’état in Cuba. In his 
discussion on revolutions, Stokes considers revolution to be the most democratic of the 
forceful ways of changing power – due to its inclusive and popular character, however, he 
claims it to be rare and unlikely to establish itself as a viable method in Latin America for 
regime change: “It is an obvious and inescapable fact that revolution is too big and too 
difficult a power mechanism to employ in Latin America with any frequency” (Stokes, 1952: 
461). Almost to defy the argument, only one year after the publication of the article, Fidel 
Castro would lead the failed attacks on the Moncada Barracks, four years later the yacht 
Granma with Fidel and Raúl Castro and Che Guevara, amongst others, would reach the 
Cuban shores, and seven years later, Fidel Castro would start consolidating his regime.  
Following WWII, American imperialism was not only characterized by economic 
interests, but also by the ideological power struggle initiated by the Cold War. The red scare 
gave the United States reason for brutality and pre-emptive military actions. In the name of 
defending their liberal, capitalist-based model of democracy, the US went both the dirty route 
and the more diplomatic route. The elephant in the region, the US founded multiple 
treatments and agreements to ensure commitment amongst the American nations to protect 
themselves from communism, and ensuring US control over Latin America; amongst them 
are the Platt Amendment, the Good Neighborhood Policy, and the TIAR (Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), the equivalent of the NATO to the Western hemisphere 
(Pinto Soria, 1999). Consequently, Latin America was not only victim to the US’ short-
temperedness on the American continent, but also saw itself required to provide troops for 
                                                        
1 The author lists: machetismo, cuartelazo, golpe de estado, revolution, imposición, 
candidato único, continuismo, and elections (Stokes, 1952). 
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vvarious proxy wars the US was fighting. According to Gerassi, “Roosevelt is the most 
intelligent imperialist the United States has ever seen (Gerassi, 1967: 414), because he was 
able to make US interventionism in Latin America invisible; while claiming to practice the 
policy of a ‘Good Neighbor,’ Gerassi argues, Roosevelt simply got more skillful at hiding his 
traces. Julio C. Pinto Soria refers to the resulting relationship between the United States and 
Latin America as one of “vassalage” (Pinto Soria, 1999: 111). 
Finding themselves in a paradoxical position of militant tutelage, Latin American 
people were robbed of their ability to oppose the United States on moral and even democratic 
grounds and to call attention to Human Rights violations being committed – directly or 
indirectly – by the United States. Any government trying to implement agrarian or social 
reforms were repeatedly cracked down upon and replaced by a government that was more 
conducive to American economic interests. The United States opposed the very liberal 
democracy they pride themselves with amongst its southern neighbors, consequently 
preventing democratic, economic and political growth. The US gave its support most readily 
to countries with a military leadership as CIA director Allan Dulles was cited, “these regimes 
are most successful in resisting the communist subversion” (Pinto Soria, 1999: 118). As a 
result, regimes curbed their populations’ freedoms significantly, persecuted and outlawed 
communist parties and their members, foreign control of major economies and corporations 
persisted. In short, structural, as well as physical violence dominated and unsettled the region. 
In a context where political violence is a norm, foreign intervention harms economic 
development and the establishment of healthy democratic system, and where social and 
agrarian reforms are much overdue, the turn to radical ideologies is a natural consequence. 
Those advocating for economic equality, political freedoms and a new social order, in Latin 
America, were militant socialists and communists. It was only reasonable that they would 
look towards the Soviet Union for a role model. The combination of the Russian Revolution 
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that ushered in communist UUSR, and the Marxist claim that armed struggle is necessary for 
a successful revolution made violence the only viable solution in the Latin American context.  
The success of the Cuban Revolution introduced a new era of US-Latin American 
relations. Sick of the constant American stick policy, the mentality ‘to meet the stick with the 
stick’ (Pinto Sorio, 1999: 117) became popular among Latin Americans. Especially guerrilla 
warfare, a hitherto unconventional route to obtain power, was a process that “deviated from 
traditional Latin-American practice” (Kling, 1962: 44). It allowed Fidel Castro and Che 
Guevara to take advantage of the dissatisfaction amongst the rural population in Cuba and the 
mountainous terrain hostile to conventional warfare, and assume a David-vs-Goliath image 
by taking on the big “octopus” (the United States itself (Guevara, 1969). Consequently, 
“nearly every Latin American guerrilla movement of the 1960s adopted Guevara’s theory” 
(Childs, 1995: 595). The Latin American opinion, therefore, was that the US octopus needed 
to be hit in each and one of its “imperialist tentacles” (Gerassi, 1967: 426), overthrown and 
completely replaced with a new, more egalitarian system. 
In Che Guevara’s words: “Generally on this continent there exist objective conditions 
which propel the masses to violent actions against their bourgeois and landlord government. 
(…) In other countries where these conditions do not occur, it is right that different 
alternatives will appear and out of theoretical discussions the tactic proper to each country 
should emerge” (Guevara, 1969: 92). Following this argument, therefore, the Indian objective 
conditions did not provide for a violent struggle. Considering the increasing militaristic 
sentiments in India during that time period, however it is important to look at agency to 
further explain the two leaders’ success.  
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The influence of travel on their perception of inequality and exploitation  
Gandhi: From an Inexperienced Lawyer to the Mahatma 
India would not have its Mahatma now, hadn’t Gandhi embarked on travels that took him 
to two countries that would shape his ideas, ideals, morals and ideology. Gandhi’s travels are 
characterized by the search for truth and morality and led to the transformation of a London-
educated law student into one of history’s most powerful leaders. Gandhi, a shy young man, 
lacking in self-confidence and the necessary skills in public speaking, did not seem to be the 
best candidate for the profession of a lawyer. Gandhi was amongst those Indians that bought 
into the idea that the British were superior, that Indians ought to dress, speak, behave, and 
adapt as much as possible to modernize. He engaged in a systematic, disciplined way of 
trying to assimilate and “playing the English Gentleman” (Gandhi, 1983: 44). He writes in 
his autobiography: “While in India, the mirror had been a luxury (…). Here (in London) I 
wasted ten minutes every day before a huge mirror“ (Gandhi, 1983: 45). Soon, however, 
Gandhi realized that he was pursuing a “false idea” (Gandhi, 1983: 46) and he started to 
return to his more ascetic ethic, as well as dedicating his time and energy to his studies.  
Religion proved to be a major influence on Gandhi’s intellectual development. He 
engaged with religions in two ways: First, he had been subjected to various forms of faiths as 
a child, which proved rather second nature and a way of life to him than a subject of 
intellectual and philosophical discipline of study. It was back home in India that the seeds 
were planted for Gandhi’s later rejection of the caste system and the persistence of the 
“untouchable” status, as the Bhakti faith taught him “God is accessible to all regardless of 
social standing and cultural background” (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2006: 186). In addition, 
Gandhi’s mother in many ways set an example for the practices her son would later embrace 
to the fullest and make central to his path to swaraj. She was a deeply religious woman who 
painstakingly observed all rituals of her faith. Taking vows and fasting, as well as praying 
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were part of her religious observance (Gandhi, 1983: 2). Self-suffering and self-sacrifice – 
often in the form of fasting – were central in young Gandhi’s life and he learnt very early on 
to make use of them and find retreat, truth and ahimsa in them (Gandhi, 1983: 24).  
Second, the interaction with and study of different religions and religious texts was 
central to Gandhi’s self-discovery during his time before his historical return to India. Both in 
London and South Africa he experimented with and studied all kinds of different faiths that 
influenced him in a certain way –  Christianity, arguably, being amongst the most influential. 
Joining the theosophical circles in London, Gandhi embarked on a religious path in which he 
read the Quran, the Old and New Testament, numerous Hindu texts, and the Gita, the “book 
par excellence for the knowledge of truth” (Gandhi, 1983: 59). His critical engagement with 
the different faiths led him to the ability to identify their various shortcomings. While 
Hinduism still resonated best with him, he took much of his later conception of ahimsa from 
Christianity; in fact, the famous quote “If someone slaps you on one cheek, turn to them the 
other also” is often attributed to Gandhi, while it actually is derived from the Bible (Gandhi, 
1983). In addition, Gandhi’s correspondences with various philosophers and writers, both 
Eastern and Western, point to his active search for the ultimate Truth.   
Apart from his intellectual experiments with religions, he also assumed many habits 
that eventually led to the self-reliance, self-suffering, and experiments on his own body, 
which would become central to his personal conception of swaraj. Whether it was mainly 
financial pragmatism or his spiritual quest, Gandhi embraced vegetarianism and gradually 
reduced his dietary needs to mostly fruits, nuts, and milk; he eventually also ventured into 
giving up the latter (Gandhi, 1983). In South Africa, especially once he started taking on civil 
cases in South Africa, Gandhi aimed to reduce his dependency on others. He thus trained 
himself in the practice of self-reliance, an idea, which characterized his economic viewpoints. 
He taught himself how to wash and iron his own clothes, how to cut his hair, and would not 
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rest until he thought himself capable of assisting the birth of his children, anticipating any 
complication during labor (Gandhi, 1983). The foregone attributes culminated in Gandhi’s 
later vision of India as a self-reliant nation based on village-economies, rather than industrial 
modernization. In terms of economic development, therefore, Gandhi and Nehru had 
significant divergences. Gandhi’s travels are thus heavily influenced by new ideas and 
ideologies, whether that be through critics of the Western path of development and 
modernization,2 Religions, or a passion to revive virtues from his own traditional roots.  
 
 
Che Guevara: The Motorcycle Diaries 
Ernestp Che Guevara is probably best known for his agency in the Cuban revolution, 
however his extensive experiences and his documentation of his travels through Latin 
America have received much attention; the most popular of which probably is the 
cinematization of his ‘Motorcycle Diaries.’ Director Walter Salles captures Latin America’s 
breathtaking natural beauty with stunning visuals. Che’s written accounts show a limited 
political understanding and projected activism, but capture his deep compassion for the 
marginalized, poor, and the sick, as well as his insatiable hunger to learn more (Guevara, 
2004). His travels, widely considered the making of a revolutionary, served as a soul-
searching journey, where he developed his own fundamental understanding of morality, 
experienced, if not on his own body through conversations with those affected by it, the 
continued exploitation of Latin America under the United States, and developed an 
understanding and interest in the political dynamics of the subcontinent.  
 During the course of his first travels through Latin America, both Castañeda and 
Elena identified the travels less in terms of a political awakening, than months of personal 
                                                        
2 E.g.: Ruskin, Tolstoy (Gokhale, 1972) 
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growth (Elena, 2010). While still in Argentina, Elena points to his difficulties in orientating 
himself as a tourist in his own country, struggling with his privilege as a middle class, 
European-looking medicine student, and visiting those tourist places advertised by the 
Peróns. Guevara saw himself as different from the rest of the Argentines travelling, “as 
someone dedicated to the serious business of investigating the inner workings of society” 
(Elena, 2010: 29). He constantly searched for a more authentic experience, authentic 
interactions with his country-men and fellow South Americans, whom he claimed to 
understand better than any North American (Elena, 2010). Both his and his travel partener 
Granado’s background in medicine justified and allowed their interaction with the sick and 
marginalized, and granted them entrance to places ordinary travellers would either be refused 
access, or simply avoid in the first place.  
 Whilst his time in Argentina may be called an attempt to struggle with his own status 
and privilege, Chile, as Drinot puts it, washed over him and his “main desire were ease, sex, 
and wine,” (Schell, 59). Generally, his first travels are said to be politically fairly ambivalent 
(Elena, 2010; Schell, 2010; Castañeda, 1997), though Guevara dedicated significant portions 
of his diary to Bolivia’s political turmoil, as well as to Bolivia’s and Peru’s indigenous 
populations. Having sought out encounters with the poor, the criminals, and the sick, Guevara 
and Granado were forced to even more intimate contact with the local populations after their 
motorbike, la poderosa, broke down in Peru (Schell, 2010). A fraternal relationship, still 
characterized by a feeling of superiority, between the two travelers and the local populations 
developed on communal trucks, the road, etc. While Che Guevara characterized the local 
Indians as “a defeated race” and “somewhat animal-like” (Drinot, 2010: 102, 103), the 
general exploitative relationship that existed between them and their – mostly white – 
superiors did not escape Guevara’s attention and written accounts.  
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 Although not grand enough to consider it a political awakening, Che Guevara’s time 
in Bolivia in 1953 can be referred to as a “political coming of age (…), together with a 
powerful anti-American anger” (Castañeda, 1998: 58). Amazed by the revolutionary spirit in 
Bolivia, Che Guevara did not fail to notice the shortcomings of the revolution, especially 
pointing to the unequal treatment of the indigenous by those in power. While Castañeda 
writes that “Guevara’s stance is still fundamentally ethical, devoid of political depth,” 
(Castañeda, 1998: 60), Drinot discerns Guevara’s increasingly political and radical 
ideological developments in Peru: “Guevara’s understanding of the indigenous experience 
provoked a desire for action.” (Drinot, 2010: 106). Indeed, Drinot cites an excellent example, 
telling of Guevara’s ideological evolution, if not political still intellectual: Conversing on the 
topic of indigenous exploitative conditions, Granado suggested to lead the Indians in a 
nonviolent, democratic revolution towards their empowerment. “Guevara’s reaction to 
Granado’s comment ridicules his travel companion’s disingenuousness at believing a 
nonviolent revolution possible: ‘ Revolution without firing a shot? You’re crazy, Petiso.’” 
(Drinot, 2010: 107) Today, it is impossible to say whether Guevara seriously started to toy 
with the idea of armed rebellion (though evidence rather confirms the opposite) or whether he 
held a romantic view of the revolutionary life and its righteous cause. Nevertheless, one can 
interpret this simple comment prophesying his future development.  
 Castañeda, staunchly holding on to his argument that Che Guevara’s travels had little 
impact on his political and military thinking, he does admit that Che Guevara recognized “a 
causal link between the deplorable destiny of ‘the proletariat around the world’ and an 
‘absurd sense of the case’ – that is, the economic, social and political status quo.”(Castañeda, 
1998: 47). Che Guevara, besides seeking out the sick and criminals, always tried to establish 
a fraternal relationship with disenfranchised workers, who lived and worked under 
exploitative conditions, mostly created by foreign masters. In these masters, Che Guevara 
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increasingly saw the “yankee imperialism” (Castañeda, 1998: 56) that had taken Latin 
America into its grip like “capitalist octopuses” (Castañeda, 1998: 62). These experiences, as 
already mentioned, caused in him a desire for action – even if only intellectually, rather than 
physically. Citing Guevara’s own words, Castañeda writes: “(…) I will not rest until I see 
these capitalist octopuses annihilated” (Castañeda, 1998: 62). Similarly, upon his return to 
Argentina before he would leave his homeland on a second trip that would have him return as 
el Che, rather than Ernesto Guevara de la Serna, he is quoted writing: “I will be with the 
people; I will dip my weapons in blood and, crazed with fury, I will cut the throats of my 
defeated enemies. I can already feel my dilated nostrils savoring the acrid smell of 
gunpowder and blood, of death to the enemy.” (Castañeda, 55). Castañeda’s own disregard of 
these words as “ranting and raving” (Castañeda, 1998: 55) seems fairly out of place at this 
point. Though Guevara may not have joined the communist movement yet, may not have had 
personal experience with the armed struggle, his ideological development does speak to a 
radicalization, if only in intellectual terms that was impossible to reverse again, and had to 
find an outlet somehow – in Guevara’s case it was the violent struggle. 
 
Significant Turning Points 
Gandhi: South Africa 
Both Gandhi’s and Che Guevara’s travels culminated in events that can be analyzed as 
significant turning points in their lives. In Gandhi’s case, this turning point is somewhat 
difficult to discern, as the events and developments leading up to his final decision to 
dedicate his life to civil disobedience are spread across his stay in South Africa.  
Gandhi extended his stay in South Africa from a mere couple of years to 21 long years. 
His stay would turn a shy young lawyer, lacking public speaking skills, into a respected civil 
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rights activist, on the forefront of all Indians living and working in South Africa during that 
time. The following will highlight some significant events and external influences that would 
lead to Gandhi’s disillusionment with the British and the Western world, resulting in “a 
principle that evoked rich religious symbolism and contributed to a dynamic method of action 
unique in Indian history” (Dalton, 1993: 14).  
As Gokhale put it, “The degeneration of Western values was demonstrated to him 
(Gandhi) through his experience of European racism in South Africa and British imperialism 
in India” (Gokhale, 1972: 217). Starting with his first arrival in South Africa, Gandhi 
experienced continuous acts of racial discrimination against himself by the Whites who saw 
themselves as superior. However, neither the infamous train scene, in which he was refused 
the right to travel in First Class based on his color, despite his holding of such ticket, nor his 
barring from various hotels, or the visible unequal treatment of indentured Indian labourers 
based on skin tone could galvanize him into rejecting the British just yet (Gandhi, 1983). 
 Nevertheless, being the only Indian attorney in South Africa, Gandhi was almost 
forced into contact with indentured labourers who had suffered from abusive treatments by 
their masters. One of his first cases was representing Balasundaram, an Indian indentured 
labourer who had been severely beaten by his master. Through this case, Gandhi was brought 
closer to the sufferings of indentured Indian labourers in South Africa, and he became known 
among their community; more and more individuals sought out his help and advice on how to 
proceed against the injustice done to them. Interestingly enough, therefore, Gandhi started to 
fight injustice trying to work through and with the British legal system and reveal, through 
belligerently fought court cases, the discriminatory, racist and exploitative nature that led to 
the Indians’ status as second class citizens. (DiSalvo, 2013).  
However, admiration for the British and loyalty to its system and modernity was not 
easily disregarded. During the second Boer War between 1899 and 1902, Gandhi famously 
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served by establishing an Indian ambulance corps, which, due to the Boers’ unexpected 
persistency, was direly needed. Sources are unclear whether Gandhi initially wished to enlist 
in the army as a soldier and the British refused him on the grounds of his skin tone, yet 
Gandhi fully supported the British during the war (DiSalvo, 2013). He stated, “’I held then 
that India could achieve her complete emancipation only within and through the British 
empire (…) The average Englishman believed that the Indian was a coward.’” (Gandhi, 1983: 
188). Thus, Gandhi clearly still held the view that by mirroring the British might and 
militaristic virtues, the Indians would be able to assert themselves as a courageous people.  
What he could not have known is that once Britain, supported by a number of foreign 
powers, annexed the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, discrimination against 
Indians would continue and to a certain extent even increase. By volunteering his service in 
the ambulance corps, Gandhi had hoped that through showing their loyalty and dedication, 
Indians would attain egalitarian status with the British. When the British revolutionized the 
transportation system in Johannesburg by introducing new tramcars running on electricity, 
people of color were barred from the use of the new tramcars. This prompted Gandhi’s 
embryonic experiments with civil disobedience. Intentionally getting Indians arrested by 
insisting on their right to ride the tramcars, Gandhi would then represent them in court, trying 
to appeal to the judges’ morality by presenting them with the absurd discriminatory practices 
against Indians (DiSalvo, 2013). While some of these cases led to success, the court cases 
were very time-consuming and had little effect. Additionally, Gandhi helped found the Natal 
Indian Congress, which aimed to fight discrimination against Indians in South Africa, as well 
as founded the newspaper Indian Opinion, where he would share his ideological changes in 
writing (Gandhi, 1983).  
One of the underlying reasons that explain the British behavior towards the Indians is 
the latters’ ascension to influential business and trading positions, after having been brought 
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to South Africa to merely work in the sugar cane plantations. Alarmed by their growing share 
in the economy, the British tried to limit the Indians’ time in South Africa by passing laws 
that would introduce registration papers and taxes punishing those that failed to re-register in 
time. Both the 25£ tax, which was then reduced to 3£, introduced in 1894, as well as the 
Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance of 1906 are influential events in Gandhi’s growing anti-
British mentality and spurred his development of civil disobedience as a form of resistance. 
More and more, he would realize that trying to resist the British system by using its own legal 
system the Indians found themselves in a disadvantage (DiSalvo, 2013).  
1906, thus is seen as the final straw for Gandhi; the Indian community reacted to the 
Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance with indignation – previous laws and regulations, as well 
as the day-to-day racial discrimination were humiliating enough, now the requirement of 
fingerprints on registration papers equated them with criminals.3 The fight against the Asiatic 
Law Amendment Ordinance marked the breakdown of the distinction between Gandhi as a 
lawyer, as a politician, and as a person. Deeply concerned by the discriminatory law, he 
emerged as the ultimate and clear leader of an Indian resistance movement that refused to 
comply. As DiSalvo writes, “The Law provided him with confidence. The law made him a 
leader. The law gave him his voice.” (DiSalvo, 2013: xiv). Gandhi fought tirelessly against 
the implementation of the law, gave speeches attended by thousands of outraged Indians who 
looked to him for guidance and leadership, wrote pieces published in the newspaper Indian 
Opinion, and represented as many Indians in court as he could.  
Dalton writes, “What Gandhi did to South Africa was less important than what South 
Africa did to him” (Dalton, 1993: 15), showing how important Gandhi’s time in South Africa 
was to his ideological development. He had started his religious and moral attitudes in 
                                                        
3 Indeed Gandhi argued that fingerprints were only required by law from criminals – 
equating Indians to criminals was therefore even more discriminatory and insulting 
(DiSalvo 186).  
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London, but they took definite shape in South Africa as he started to become more involved 
in ascetic practices of self-reliance – cutting his own hair, washing his own clothes, and 
learning how to assist his at his own children’s birth (Gandhi, 1983; Dalton, 1993). Gandhi 
found his mission and purpose in the Indians’ struggle in South Africa for egalitarian 
treatment; he started to call for communal noncooperation, encouraging jail sentences as a 
way to exercise leverage over the British, while subsequently creating the foundations on 
which India’s liberation struggle would be fought on: swaraj, ahimsa, satyagraha (DiSalvo, 
2013). Gandhi the revolutionary was born.  
 
Che Guevara: Guatemala 
In contrast to Gandhi’s long-winded path to his final rejection of Western ideals, Che 
Guevara’s ideological turning point is easier to discern. Attracted by the overwhelming 
indigenous population of Guatemala, which had intrigued him already in Bolivia and Peru, 
“Guevara sought and found a reform process similar to that in Bolivia – but perhaps more 
radical and, in any case, fresher and more defiant toward the United States” (Castañeda, 
1997: 62). Guevara’s time in Guatemala can also be referred to as a political awakening, as 
much of his political thought and political expression found root in what he saw unfold in 
Guatemala during his time there.  
 Guatemala saw itself prosper in during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Having 
overthrown a ruthless dictator in 1944, presidents Arévalo and Árbenz tried to establish a 
more egalitarian, nationalist government, that followed the path of capitalist development. 
The United States, supportive of the development of Third World states, welcomed those 
changes, only until their interests were not affected (Immerman, 1980). As large-scale 
agrarian reforms put into place by Árbenz threatened and caused the expropriation and 
redistribution of land, owned to a large extent by the United Fruit Company, the United 
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States, under President Eisenhower and Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, feared for the 
interests of the American owned corporation (Immerman, 1980-81). Subsequently, American 
corporate interests were phrased in politico-ideological terms, and the State Department 
accused Guatemala of communism, which allowed them to declare Guatemala a threat to 
national security. As Richard H. Immerman puts it, “(US) government officials brought with 
them an outlook on world politics that was fashioned by the cold war ethos” (Immerman, 
1980-81: 638). What followed was one of America’s most successful, but also most 
controversial Cold War involvements in Latin America. While the CIA trained and financed 
a team of Guatemalan exiles and prepared them for the overthrow of Árbenz’ government, its  
direct strategy was much more psychological than militaristic: the State Department planted 
news stories on Guatemala’s communist threat, dropped anti-government leaflets from 
aircrafts, as well as penetrated and influenced the Catholic Church to spread anti-Arbenz 
pastoral messages, amongst other tactics (Immerman, 1980-81). Disguising the actual 
military strength of the insurgent group lead by Castillo Armas, the strategy worked and 
Árbenz saw himself forced to resign in the midst of chaos ensued by US efforts.  
 Witnessing these developments was crucial in Che Guevara’s development of his 
political and anti-American thinking. Empathizing with the Guatemalan people by identifying 
as one of them – a fellow Latin American, and regarding Árbenz as influential in the 1944 
revolution, Che Guevara was fascinated as well as exasperated by the unfolding events. In the 
time leading up to the coup and throughout it, Che Guevara became increasingly interested in 
communist thought, sought out and surrounded himself with like-minded and inspirational 
people, and expressed the intent to eventually join the communist party or movement 
“somewhere in the world” (Castañeda, 1998: 72). Although he started calling for concrete 
(armed) action (Forster: 2010), Che Guevara’s time in Guatemala was still characterized by 
the life and study of an intellectual. He tried to deal with and make sense of the unfolding 
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events by spending hours studying in the library and talking to more or less influential, 
communist scholars or thinkers that had sought refuge in Guatemala (Forster, 2010). 
Especially influential in establishing these contacts and fueling his communist developments 
was Hilda Gaeda, a Peruvian communist militant in exile. According to various sources, the 
relationship was more fraternal than romantic or erotic (Forster, 2010; Castañeda, 1998), yet 
she was influential in both keeping him economically afloat, as well as connected with 
various influential, communist contacts.  
 Amongst those many contacts were a disproportionate amount of Cubans, many of 
which were exiles, having escaped Cuba’s Batista after the failed attacks on the Moncada 
Barracks, led by Fidel Castro. In Gaeda’s words, “the Cubans were different” (Forster, 2014), 
and their stories, excitement to return to the struggle, and their description of Fidel Castro 
caught fire in Che Guevara. Their camaraderie and enthusiasm left a deep mark on him and 
undoubtedly contributed to his future development, even though he may not have known it 
then.4 During the more dangerous time of the US invasion leading up to the coup, Guevara 
sought asylum in the Argentinian embassy, where he developed a deeper appreciation for and 
connection with communism, and, arguably, also radicalized in his views on the necessity of 
armed struggle against American imperialism in Latin America (Castañeda, 1998). As Forster 
put it, “Guatemala was a magnet for people committed to social justice” (Forster, 2010: 213). 
Che Guevara, partly because he sought them out, but partly also because they found 
themselves in similar stages of life, was thus surrounded by communist, militant exiles.  
 If Che Guevara’s time in Guatemala was characterized by a political awakening, 
Mexico was, until he met Fidel Castro, a time of political ambivalence, indifference for the 
country’s beauty, and confusion regarding his new responsibilities as a husband and soon-to-
                                                        
4 During this period, Che Guevara still held true to his plans to travel to Mexico, and then 
leave for Europe and possibly China. Although his political views took on shape and 
radicalized, he still had not taken on the persona of a revolutionary (Castañeda, 1998).  
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be father. However, the surprising reencounter by coincidence – or maybe destiny – with a 
Cuban exile he had met in Guatemala, Ñico Lopez, Che Guevara was introduced to Raul 
Castro, a Cuban student leader, recently released from a Havana jail. A few days later, Raúl’s 
brother, Fidel arrived – an encounter that would change Che Guevara’s, and perhaps the 
world’s history forever. Castro provided Che Guevara with a sense of purpose that he had 
been searching for throughout his travels (Zolov, 2010) He found passion in the discipline 
that the life and training of a guerrillero requires, threw himself into more studies of 
Marxism, established contacts with Soviet individuals and started learning Russian. Despite 
his asthma, he embraced the physical training the group of revolutionaries received from a 
Mexican wrestlers – finally, in Mexico, the year-long intellectual preparation, made up of 
personal experiences as well as intellectual studies and conversations, found a physical 
expression. Guatemala and Mexico can be seen as the culmination of Guevara’s travels and 
therefore his search of purpose, which he found in the armed, revolutionary struggle. The 
events in Guatemala were insofar a significant turning point in Che Guevara’s ideological 
thinking, as he was directly confronted with a situation of clear US intervention to defend 
American corporate interests in the country, under the disguise of fighting the threat of 
communism in its backyard. Che Guevara, who through his travels had identified with a 
transcontinental Latin American identity, was deeply marked by this injustice, and through 
the interactions with communist exiles, he transformed from the medicine student Ernesto to 
“el Che”5 the CIA would have one of the biggest files of. 
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DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
In summary, Che Guevara’s and Gandhi’s struggles originated from similar 
ideological starting points, but the influences that determined their revolutionary movement 
were insofar different, as that they resulted in a violent and a nonviolent outcome. Interesting 
to note is that despite the divergences in their influences and the nature of their social 
movements, many parallels can be drawn between the movements themselves.  
The following section lays out the argument that violence and nonviolence are simply 
tactics employed in the grander scheme of a revolution, and not the defining factor when 
considering the Cuban Revolution and the Indian road to independence. Investigating the two 
movements shows a strikingly similar organization, vision, and moral obligation and 
determination amongst the charismatic leadership to improve the situation for the better by 
establishing a new social order.  
Revolution 
The definitions of a revolution in the context of social movements, according to 
Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, can be summarized by “an activity or movement by 
many people designed to effect fundamental changes in the socioeconomic, political 
situation, aimed at the replacement of government or ruler” (Merriam Webster Online 
Dictionary). Many definitions, however, also include the aspect that the acquisition of power, 
or the overthrow of the existing power structure, requires “violence” (Dictionary.com; 
Cambridge Dictionary Online). Some of the most famous revolutions (Mexican revolution, 
Russian revolutions, Cuban revolution) were violent ones; this has led to the common 
perception that revolutions, as in a political struggle, need to be violent.6 In the broader sense 
of the definition, revolution is merely a sudden and radical change to the existing order; both 
                                                        
6 Other revolutions, which may include the fundamental way of thinking about or 
visualizing something, is not included in this definition (Merriam Webster Online 
Dictionary).  
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the Cuban Revolution and Gandhi’s Satyagraha fit this category perfectly. The following 
will identify the similarities between the two movements, demonstrating that they both are 
revolutions. In addition, a closer look shows that they have much more in common than only 
their goal of self-determination and liberation.  
 
Social Reform 
Neither of the two movements merely aimed for a change in the political leadership; 
instead, both Che Guevara and Gandhi had a bigger vision in mind: the transformation of the 
socio-, politico-, and economic situation. For Gandhi, nationalism was not the ultimate goal, 
and neither did he trust the state, whose power he thought needed to be curbed (Gokhale, 
1972). Gandhi’s vision was much greater than the replacement of the British system by an 
Indian one. He envisioned a self-reliant, village-centered economy, far from Western 
modernization and industrialization, as he, one of the first environmentalists, predicted the 
destructiveness of Western modernization. For him, the problem of exploitation was not 
necessarily one of power relations, but of modern industrial civilization and capitalization, 
which lead to self-destruction, as they disregard morality and religion (Gokhale 220). In 
addition, he disregarded colonialism as immoral, by claiming that “multiplication of wants is 
theft” (Kozhuvanal, 1999: 445), emphasizing the need for nonviolence to transform the 
society through active service. He believed in the Indian people to make that change 
collectively, based on ancient Indian traditions, which he reinterpreted in such a way that 
revolutionary ideas, clothed in familiar expression, could be readily adopted and employed 
towards revolutionary ends” (Kozhuvanal. 1999: 440). 
 Similarly, the Cuban revolution not only fought the unjust Cuban dictator, Batista, but 
saw as its enemy the neocolonial control the United States exerted over the entire region of 
Latin America. Cuba’s struggle was a symbolic one, exemplifying the century-long 
 35 
exploitative reality Latin Americans had had to endure, and its success was supposed to be a 
wake up call to all the other states to join in on it. Che Guevara’s, amongst others, leadership 
was essential in bringing about the revolution. As a factor for Che Guevara’s success, Pinto 
Soria identifies his unorthodox thinking, his way of assuming full responsibilities of his 
actions, and, most importantly, proposing solutions to the existing problems, while leading as 
an example (Pinto Soria, 1999). Moreno writes, a guerrilla fighter needs to be a” social 
reformer, a man who fully dedicates himself to destroy an unjust social order to replace it 
with something new” (Moreno, 1970: 116). However, in contrast to Gandhi, Che Guevara 
was looking for less of a fundamental change. Che Guevara did not consider modernization 
as destructive, rather, he rebelled against the inequalities Latin Americans had been subjected 
to since the arrival of Columbus. His goals were aimed at a makeover of the economic 
structure of Cuba, and a more equitable society towards a prosperous future. Looking towards 
the Soviet Union as an example, communism was a plausible response to the seemingly 
failing free market system in the West   
 
Organization 
Important similarities can also be drawn between the organizations of the two 
movements. Neither guerrilla warfare, nor civil disobedience, can be successful without mass 
support; indeed, the strength of both lies in the participation of the masses. While guerrilla 
warfare, due to its violent nature, needs to fight for its recognition and consequent mass 
support, nonviolent action does not need to hide, but its very strength lies in the open 
confrontation of the enemy. Essential to the mass struggle, however, is a center of a well-
trained and disciplined group; in the Cuban case it is what Che Guevara coined the foco 
group in his renowned foco theory, comparable to Gandhi’s ashramites. The foco is a small 
group of fighters, operating in the rural areas and under the protection of the mountains and 
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peasants, with supporters and sympathizers in the cities. They are what Guevara refers to as 
the subjective conditions that can speed up the revolutionary process; it is the vanguard, and 
also the political and military center of the revolution (Moreno, 1970). The masses start 
siding with the foco as their armed attacks bear fruit, and expose the government’s weakness 
and likelihood to employ indiscriminate violence against its own population to maintain 
power. Che Guevara’s attempt to lead Bolivia towards a successful revolution on the 
blueprint of Cuba’s revolution shows the importance of a strong foco, and the necessary 
support of the peasantry. Bolivian’s, compared to the Cubans, were not as disciplined and 
well-trained, and although the Bolivian mountains would have provided the ideal objective 
conditions, the peasantry did not side with the guerrillas – which would lead to Che 
Guevara’s doom.  
In contrast to Gandhi’s civil disobedience, however, the employment of violence did 
not allow for an inclusive movement. Cuba’s guerrilla group was mostly limited to physically 
fit men, determined to dedicate all their energy to one cause, putting themselves and their 
family in grave danger. While the group accepted some women into its ranks in the Sierra 
Maestra, the vanguard of the revolution was carried by one type of man, relying on the 
support of the population for survival and success. In addition, Che Guevara’s and Fidel 
Castro’s ideology – socialism, which turned into communism – further alienated a part of the 
population, and to an extent they also aimed for that alienation in order to establish the social 
order they envisioned. In this social order, the bourgeoisie was an obstacle to the construction 
of socialism, and due to their general rejection of agrarian reform widely did not support the 
revolution (Childs, 1995).  
It is important to note that Gandhi’s civil disobedience was far from peaceful and free 
of dangers. Again, nonviolent resistance is often being romanticized, without taking into 
account its great risks for the participant. Thus, the general conception that nonviolent 
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resistance is accommodating of all and everybody is not necessarily right. Women mostly 
constituted the support group for the men engaging in civil disobedience, and the social 
repercussions from participating could be detrimental; death, imprisonment, injury, hunger 
and thirst, heat and cold, and dismissal on the grounds of participation in anti-government 
movements are only a few consequences participants took upon them (Misra, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the confrontation between the resistance and the government does not require 
hideouts in the mountains and sporadic, hit-and-run attacks. Its strength lies in the open and 
direct confrontation, in which it ties the government’s hands by assuming the moral high 
ground. To this effect “Gandhi held that anything that millions can do together is charged 
with a unique power, the magical potency of collective tapas ( = asceticism) and moral 
fervor, the cumulative strength of generally shared sacrifices” (Kozhuvanal, 1999: 447). Both 
struggles, therefore, relied on mass support for their success; due to their violence or 
nonviolent nature, the form of the mass struggle differed.  
 
Discipline 
No matter the difference in organization of the mass struggle, central to both 
revolutions is an ideology informed by similar motivations and values. In both contexts, 
social reform in terms of a change in government or economic policies is not enough. What 
Gandhi and Che Guevara both strived for was a transformation of the revolutionaries 
themselves. Since both leaders had found their purpose in their respective struggles, they 
required equal dedication and discipline from their followers. An interesting parallel can be 
drawn between their ascetic lifestyles.   
While in London, Gandhi, disillusioned with the West and its lifestyles that seemed 
incompatible with his values, started experimenting with dietetics by reducing his dietetic 
needs to the bare minimum, and self-reliance by learning how to cut his own hair, wash his 
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own clothes and deliver his own children (Gandhi, 1983). In South Africa and India he would 
then take these values to an extreme, first on himself and then requiring iron discipline that 
was closely related to soldierly conduct and restraint from his followers (Misra, 2014). 
Influenced by Jainism ascetic conception of ahimsa and other religious traditions, regarded 
preparation as important as the ‘battle’ itself (Kozhuvanal, 1999).  
Maria Misra points to Gandhi’s obsession with values associated with soldiers and 
heroism, most likely to have originated in Gandhi’s early admiration of British military might 
(Misra, 2014). Other than a peaceful, non-structured lot, Gandhi’s satyagrahis were not only 
encouraged to the ascetic lifestyle Gandhi had taken on, but he also drilled them in an almost 
militaristic fashion: “Satyagrahis should train their bodies through strict religious austerities 
by taking vows of celibacy, control of the palate (…) , and the determination to avoid 
‘overstimulation’” (Misra, 2014: 703). To this effect Gandhi emphasized that “There must be 
no raw recruits at big demonstrations, and only the most experienced should be at the head” 
(Misra, 2014: 702). Indeed, superior discipline amongst the followers was necessary, as 
Gandhi saw it as the satyagrahi’s duty to die for the people, should the time arise (Misra, 
2014). Following their leader, the satyagrahis were expected to place the struggle above all 
selfish/personal needs; in contrast to Che Guevara’s guerrilla movement, however, the 
satyagrahis’ ultimate goal was not necessarily political self-determination, but self-rule and 
self-restraint, out of which nationalism and self-determination would arise.  
As already established, Che Guevara’s travels were characterized by a search for 
morality and a purpose. In contrast to Gandhi, Che Guevara did not lead a self-reliant life of 
non-attachment to material things because he wanted to and found spiritual and religious 
meaning in it; rather, he did so due to financial hardships. Both Forster and Castañeda 
repeatedly mention Che Guevara’s meager financial means and difficulty to find a job 
(Forster, 2010; Castañeda, 1998). Due to the lacking opportunities to work in the medical 
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field, he even grew dissatisfied, disillusioned and disinterested in his profession. In addition, 
his refusal to wear a suit and a tie out of principle did not help his unemployed status 
(Castañeda, 1998). 
This is not to say that Che Guevara was necessarily lazy or weak. Ofttimes bedridden 
due to his frequent asthma attacks especially in high altitudes and humid environments, Che 
Guevara felt defeated by his own medical condition (Guevara, 2004). Nevertheless, he 
tirelessly challenged his will power and his body by climbing Machu Picchu, diving for a 
dead bird Granado had shot in a freezing cold glacier (Guevara, 2004), or took on inhumane 
shifts in the Atlantic Highway Project, unloading barrels of tar from 6pm until 6am (Forster, 
2010), less out of monetary needs but because he wanted to be able to empathize with the 
poor, marginalized populations.  
Once having joined Fidel Castro’s group in Mexico, Che Guevara submitted himself 
readily to the harsh physical training that was to prepare the future revolutionaries for the 
struggle against the Batista dictatorship (Zulov, 2010). It was as if he had finally found his 
calling, his purpose in life – the accumulation of his intellectual development and thinking 
throughout his struggles had found an outlet: armed revolutionary battle. In Cuba’s Sierra 
Maestra mountains, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro would insist on “train(ing) the men into a 
school of discipline, self control and endurance facing physical exhaustion are part of the 
everyday routine (…)” (Moreno, 1970: 122). This discipline would ensure a well-trained, 
deadly foco group. Similar to Gandhi’s civil disobedience, the Cuban guerrilleros were 
trained to resist physically and mentally the hardships of a guerrilla life (Guevara, 1969). Che 
Guevara considered the ideal type of guerrilla as “a man who leads an ascetic life with 
impeccable morality with strict self-control and who seeks to introduce social reforms 
through personal example” (Moreno, 1970: 116). Surprising parallels can thus be drawn 
between the ideal satyagrahi and the ideal guerrillero.  
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Visualizing the difference between the violent and nonviolent movement, however, 
discipline was strictly enforced in the Sierra Maestra; three crimes were punishable by death: 
insubordination, desertion and defeatism”( Moreno, 1970: 121). The violent nature of the 
guerrilla struggle, thus, was not only applied against the enemy, but also against the own 
following should they deviate from the expectations.  
 
The aforementioned comparison of both movements does not only show how similar 
they are but how perfectly they fit the definition of a revolution. So, the sole aspect in which 
the two revolutions differ is the use of violence and nonviolence. The question, thus, arises: 
Is violence a strategy or a tactic? If they are both revolutions that can be identified as 
ideological strategies, then violence and nonviolence are the tactics emerging from the 
strategies. The following is an attempt to understand this logic and explain why it is 
significant.  
Tactics, strategy, and goal are largely analyzed in a linear form, which may allow for 
some well-fitting models and arguments, but for the most part disregard any flexibility in the 
subjective conditions of a social movement. While one could argue that both Gandhi’s and 
Che Guevara’s goal was self-determination, their strategies were nonviolence and violence, 
respectively, and their tactics were mass civil disobedience and guerrilla warfare, this paper 
has shown that tactic, strategy, and goal for these two movements are not as clean cut. Instead 
of identifying the employment of violence or nonviolence as a strategy, this paper shows that 
they were ideological choices, not decided upon following a clear rationale.  
Although also limited, a better approach to strategy and tacticsis the following: First, both 
Gandhi and Che Guevara had a vision, which was much greater than a simple goal. Instead of 
self-determination only, they envisioned a fundamental revolution (for the lack of a better 
word) of the social, political, and economic sphere. In addition, neither of the two considered 
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their struggle to be limited to India and Cuba only, but called for the internationalization of 
their struggles, as they saw their strategies as correct for countries and populations in similar 
conditions.  
Gandhi’s vision for India and for the entire world was so much bigger than only self-
determination, or swaraj in its political connotation. Rather, Gandhi envisioned swaraj to 
come from within each and every individual, only then a truly just society can be established. 
Rudolf Heredia writes, “swaraj was not something given by the leaders, Indian or British, it 
was something that had to be taken by the people for themselves” (Heredia, 1999). The 
word’s spiritual meaning of freedom, therefore, is important to precede the political meaning 
of freedom (Dalton, 1993). Political self-rule without individual self-rule, in Gandhi’s view, 
is not sufficient. In addition, Gandhi also claimed the universal application of his civil 
disobedience. Much contested are his views on the Jewish holocaust, on which he is quoted 
saying: “(…) the Jews should have offered themselves to the butcher’s knife. They should 
have thrown themselves into the sea from cliffs... It would have aroused the world and the 
people of Germany… As it is they succumbed anyway in their millions” (Teacher Forum, 
2014). This quote shows the “almost magical powers” (Misra, 2014) he ascribed to his 
satyagraha and his deep conviction that nonviolence is superior to the violent struggle.  
Che Guevara saw the Cuban Revolution to be only the beginning of a much larger 
movement: “The Cuban Revolution sounded the bell which gave the alarm” (Guevara, 1969: 
99). His vision was the continuous struggle in all parts of the world threatened by US 
imperialism and the growing threat of the European Common Market (Gueavara, 1969). Che 
allowed for and expected shortcomings to arise, and emphasized the need to never lose sight 
of the bigger struggle: “The outcome of today’s struggle does not matter (…) what is definite 
is the decision to struggle which matures every day, the consciousness of the need for 
revolutionary change, and the certainty that it is possible” (Guevara, 1969: 102).  
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Second, the short-term goal of self-determination from the direct and indirect control of 
foreign powers is thus subordinated to the greater vision in both movements discussed.  
Third, other than arguing that nonviolence and violence are the strategies of both 
movements, I would argue that revolution in its broader context is the strategy the two 
leaders employed to reach their goal and come closer to realizing their vision. Although the 
similarities between the two revolutions led by Gandhi and Che Guevara have been identified 
above, it is important to emphasize that each had its own unique ideology to it. An ideology, 
and the clear formulation of which, is essential, as revolutions strive for a fundamental 
change and restructuring of the status quo establishment. Without an ideology, there is no 
revolution; in other words, the strategy to achieve the goal and, in the long run the vision, 
would be lacking.  
In contrast, Gallagher Cunningham discusses the “strategic choice” of a group 
seeking self-determination by hypothesizing that “groups use nonviolent strategies when 
there are barriers to conventional politics and when they anticipate being able to overcome 
the challenges to mobilization of a mass nonviolent campaign (…) and groups use violence 
when there are barriers to conventional politics, and when they anticipate being able to 
impose costs on the state through violence” (Cunningham, 2013: 294). However, 
Cunningham’s argument is an analysis of a cost-benefit-analysis, which assumes that leaders 
make a conscious decision of whether or not to employ violence in their movement. 
Cunningham does not take into account the fact that actors and leaders in movements are 
influenced by their ideologies. These movements (or campaigns, as she also calls them) are 
not rational politics, which can be weighed according to the extent to which costs can be 
afflicted on the existing government. The decision to fight against the established political 
system is not one like that. As this paper has shown, structure and agency need to be taken 
into account to understand the development of an ideology.  
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As Che Guevara points out, “The task of the revolutionary forces in each county is to 
initiate the struggle when the conditions are present, regardless of the conditions in other 
countries. The development of the struggle will bring about the general strategy”7 (Guevara, 
1969: 98). Violence, therefore, is not the strategy, but the tactic. The strategy itself is the 
revolutionary struggle, on the basis of Che Guevara’s and Fidel Castro’s ideology and 
leadership. He claims, “The political and military chieftains (…) will learn the art of war 
during the course of the war itself. (…) the struggle itself is the great teacher” (Guevara, 
1969: 94).  
 And finally, this then leads to the tactics of both struggles: nonviolence and violence, 
which are contingent upon the ideological strategy – the revolution. Instead of treating 
violent and nonviolent movements as different, therefore, they are two sides of the same coin. 
This contextualization may help future scholarship to study nonviolence and violence in 
comparison.  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
While the structural context did not leave Che Guevara with much of a choice but to 
opt for a violent tactic, Gandhi’s case is less clear. India’s context did not provide for 
nonviolence as clearly as Latin America’s did for a violent tactic. Thus, Gandhi’s agency 
appears to be of greater significance. Making use of Che Guevara’s argument that subjective 
conditions (=leadership) can accelerate revolution and provide for the ripening of objective 
conditions (=structural context) conducive to revolution, Gandhi’s agency and his 
formulation of an ideological strategy is exemplary (Guevara, 1969: 91). Barnes writes: 
“Without proper social conditions the society would regard the potential leader as an 
eccentric getting excited over nothing. ” (Barnes, 1978:4). The same author goes on to cite 
                                                        
7 Emphasis not in original. 
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Friedland (1964): “While charismatics are continually being generated, their ‘charisma’ can 
frequently be unrecognized or indeed be considered peculiar, deviant, or perhaps insane” 
(Barnes, 1978: 4). Thus, there is a very fine line between a successful, charismatic leader and 
a lunatic. The ideas of a revolutionary leader, such as Gandhi, may seem crazy and over the 
top in times of political stability and prosperity. Are the structural conditions right, however, 
a lunatic with the same ideas can very well become the man or woman at the forefront of a 
revolution. As Jay Conger points out, “(charismatic) leaders (…) are masters of change, who 
can inspire us to take risks, and who possess a keen sense of strategic opportunity” (Conger, 
1989: 8). Both Che Guevara and Gandhi realized the strategic opportunity that presented 
themselves, though in light of India’s more complex structural context, Gandhi was more 
successful in inspiring the Indians in South Africa and India to take the risk of 
noncooperation.  
Considering the aforementioned finding that violence or nonviolence are tactical 
choices, the following topics are worthy of closer investigation in the future: The case studies 
mentioned in this paper both represent a struggle for self-determination from an exploitative, 
foreign power. What tactics, therefore, are most conducive in strategies other than revolutions 
with the goal of self-determination from a foreign power? What influences the tactical 
choices of a movement with the goal of stopping the practice of animal testing? Or an 
environmental movement aiming to decrease the deforestation in erosion-prone areas? All 
these movements have clearly defined goals and ideologically informed strategies; however, 
it would be interesting to investigate the tactical choice of using nonviolence or violence as a 
result of the ideological strategy in order to achieve a goal other than self-determination.  
Second, Nelson Mandela would be a perfect intermediary case study between Gandhi 
and Che Guevara, as his tactics did not stay the same but switched according to outside 
events and influences, which impacted his strategy. Interesting to investigate would be the 
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exact reasons that led him to adopt one and abandon the other, and perhaps the findings 
would contribute to the delicate difference between nonviolence and violence. 
In conclusion, the comparative study of violent and nonviolent movements remains fairly 
understudied. Much research needs to be done towards the understanding of tactics and 




Barnes, D. F. (1978). Charisma and Religious Leadership: An Historical Analysis. Journal 
for the Scientific Study of Religion, 17(1), 1-18.  
Castañeda J. G. (1998). First Blood: Navigating is Necessary, Living Is Not. Compañero: 
The Life and Death of Che Guevara. New York: Vintage Books. 44-77.  
Chabot, S. (2015). Making Sense of Civil Resistance: From Theories and Techniques to 
Social Movement Phronesis. In Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on 
Nonviolent Struggle, Kurt Schock (ed.). University of Minnesota Press, 2015.  
Checkki, D. A.. (1993). SOME TRADITIONS OF NONVIOLENCE AND 
PEACE. International Journal on World Peace, 10(3), 47–54. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20751913 
Chenoweth, E. (2011). Think Again: Nonviolent Resistance. Foreign Policy, Retrieved from 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/24/think-again-nonviolent-resistance/ 
Chenoweth, E. (2013) The success of nonviolent civil resistance: Erica Chenoweth at 
TEDxBoulder.” YouTube video. Published November 4, 2013. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJSehRlU34w 
Childs, M. D. (1995). An Historical Critique of the Emergence and Evolution of Ernesto Che 
Guevara’s Foco Theory. Journal of Latin American Studies , 27(3), 593-624. Retrieved 
from Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/158485 
Conger, J (1989). The Charismatic Leader: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Brass Publishers.  
Cunningham, K. G.. (2013). Understanding strategic choice: The determinants of civil war 
and nonviolent campaign in self-determination disputes. Journal of Peace Research, 
50(3), 291-304. DOI: 10.1177/0022343313475467 
Dalton, D. (1993). Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
DiSalvo, C. R. (2013). M.K. Gandhi, Attorney at Law: A Man Before the Mahatma. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press.  
Doninger, W. (2009). The Hindus: An Alternative History. New York: Penguin. 382 - 546. 
Drinot, P. (2010). Awaiting the Blood of a Truly Emancipating Revolution: Che Guevara in 
19502 Peru. In Che’s Travels: The Making of a Revolutionary in 19502 Latin America. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press. 88-126. 
Elena, E. (2010). Point of Departure: Travel and Nationalism in Ernesto Guevaraäs 
Argentina. In P. Drinot (Ed.), Che’s Travels: The Making of a Revolutionary in 19502 
Latin America. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 21-52. 
Forster, C. (2010). “Not in All of America Can There Be Found a Country as Democratic as 
This One”: Che and Revolution in Guatemala. In Che’s Travels: The Making of a 
Revolutionary in 19502 Latin America. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
210-244.  
Gabbert, W. (2012). The long durée of Colonial Violence in Latin America. Historical Social 
Research, 37 (3), 254-275. Retrieved from:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/41636608 
Gandhi, M. K. (1983). Autobiography. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 
 47 
Gerassi, J. (1967). Violencia, revolución y cambio structural en América Latina. Revista 
Mexicana de Sociología, 29(3), 407-427. DOI: 10.2307/3539104 
Gokhale, B. G.. (1972). Gandhi and History. History and Theory, 11(2), 214–225. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2504587 
Guevara, E. (1969). CHE: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara. R.E. Bonachea & N. P. 
Valdes (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Guevara, E. (2004). Diarios de Motocicleta: Notas de Viaje por América Latina. New York: 
Ocean Press.   
Heredia, R. C. (1999). Interpreting Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj. Economic and Political Weekly, 




Immerman, R. H. (1980-81). Guatemala as Cold War History. Political Science Quarterly, 
95(4), 629-653. DOI: 10.2307/2150608 
Kling, M. (1962). Cuba: Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Political Power by the 
Application of Unconventional Warfare. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 341, 42-52. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1034142 
Kozhuvanal, A.. (1999). Gandhi’s Satyagraha and Its Roots in India’s Past. In P. Brock & T. 
P. Socknat (Eds.), Challenge to Mars: Pacifism from 1918 to 1945 (pp. 440–454). 
University of Toronto Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/9781442672796.34 
Misra, M. (2014). Sergeant-Major Gandhi: Indian Nationalism and Nonviolent “Martiality.” 
The Journal of Asian Studies, 73(03). 689-709. DOI: 10.1017.S0021911814000485 
Mohr, J. M. (2013). Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Harmful Leadership with a Moral Façade. 
Journal of Leadership Studies, 7(1), 18-21. 
Moreno, J.A. (1970). Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 12(2), 114-133. Retrieved from: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/177959 
Pinto Soria, J. C. (1999). Orígenes Y Destino de las Revoluciones Latinoamericanas: Ernesto 
“Che” Guevara, Mario Payeras y Guatemala. Mesoamérica, 102-133. Retrieved from 
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2401143 
Rosenberg, T. (2015). How to Topple a Dictator (Peacefully). New York TimesAccessed 
March 8, 2016. Retrieved from http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/a-
military-manual-for-nonviolent-war/?_r=0 
Roy, G. C. (1976). Indian Culture: The Tradition of Non-Violence and Social Change in 
India. New Delhi: Ajanta Publications 
Rudolph, L. I., Rudolph S. H. (2006). Postmodern Gandhi and Other Essays: Gandhi in the 
World and at Home. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 177-252 
 48 
Schell, P. A. (2010). Beauty and Bounty in Che’s Chile. In Che’s Travels: The Making of a 
Revolutionary in 19502 Latin America. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
53-87.  
Seferiades, S., & Johnston, H. (2012). Violent Protest, Contentious Politics, and the 
Neoliberal State. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012.  
Sen, A. (2005). The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
Sharp, G. (2010). From Dictatorship to Democracy. East Boston: The Albert Einstein 
Institution.  
Sharp, G. (2012). From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for 
Liberation. New York: New Press. 
Stokes, W. S.. (1952). Violence as a Power Factor in Latin-American Politics. The Western 
Political Quarterly, 5(3), 445-468. DOI: 10.2307/442605 
Teacher Forum. (2014). Famous Social Reformers & Revolutionaries 1: Mahatma Gandhi. 
Lulu Press, Inc. 
Weber, M. (1968). On Charisma and Institution Building. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.  
